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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
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has made the requisite findings to support the award under that rule. See Kilpatrick, et al v. 
Bullough Abatement, Inc., et ai, 2008 UT 82, ^22-23, 199 P.3d 957. 
A. The District Court Did Not Identify The Rule Under Which It Was Imposing 
Sanctions. 
McQueen sought sanctions against PC Crane under Rules 37(b)(2), 37(d), and 
26(g). (Br. of Appellee at Addendum 1.) Neither McQueen nor the District Court identify 
which rule of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorize sanctions in this case. (R at. 3911-
3915, 3933-3936.) The only rule even briefly mentioned in McQueen's Reply Brief is Rule 
26(g). However, the District Court did not find that PC Crane made any "certification" in 
violation of Rule 26(g) in connection with any discovery response. (R. at 3911-3915, 3933-
3936) Instead, the District Court ruled as follows: 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs position on March 26,2008, that 
the trailer had never been built, was inconsistent with Plaintiffs' 
previous position that the trailer had existed, there was just no 
documentation regarding the trailer. Based upon the 
inconsistency of Plaintiffs position, the Court holds that 
sanctions are appropriate on the Second Motion for Sanctions. 
(R. 3913-3914 (emphasis added)) The District Court's finding that PC Crane's earlier 
statement was inconsistent with its later position does not support an award of sanctions. 
B. The Court Did Not Make the Factual Findings Necessary to Support an 
Award of Sanctions. 
Assuming that there is a basis for awarding sanctions under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, this Court must determine whether the district court has made a factual 
finding that the party's behavior merits sanctions." Killpatrick, 2008 UT 82 at f 23 
(emphasis in original). The Utah Supreme Court has recently made clear that sanctions are 
2 
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only warranted when: "(1) the party's behavior was willful; (2) the party has acted in bad 
faith; (3) the court can attribute some fault to the party; or (4) the party has engage in 
persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process." Id. (emphasis added). 
In Kilpatrick, the court held that for purposes of imposing sanctions the term 
'"fault' should not be interpreted to include unintentional behavior." Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82, 
at TJ33. The Kilpatrick court specifically refused to adopt a "strict liability interpretation" in 
imposing sanctions and required that something more than a mere failure to comply must be 
shown. See id. 
The District Court's finding that PC Crane took "inconsistent" positions does 
not rise to the level required to issue sanctions under Utah law. The District Court made no 
finding of willfulness, bad faith, fault, or persistent dilatory tactics on the part of PC Crane. 
Instead, the District Court found merely that PC Crane's earlier position that there were no 
documents relating to the custom designed trailer was technically inconsistent with its later 
disclosure that the trailer had not been built. The District Court then awarded a minimal 
amount of attorney fees based on the inconsistency. (R. at 3914.) Because the District Court 
made no factual finding of fault against PC Crane, the award of sanctions should be reversed. 
McQueen argues that the Court should infer intentional misconduct based on 
the District Court's Ruling and his own belief that PC Crane and its counsel have repeatedly 
lied in this litigation. (Reply Br. of Appellant atlO-11.) Such an inference, however, is 
inconsistent with the District Court's statements in its April 29,2009 Ruling on the Second 
Motion to Compel. By the time the District Court ruled on McQueen's Second Motion for 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Sanctions, McQueen had already asked for sanctions against PC Crane on multiple occasions 
and had incorrectly accused PC Crane and its counsel of lying and intentionally withholding 
information on virtually every issue in the litigation.1 (R. at 832-840,940-945,1537-1546.) 
In an apparent rejection of McQueen's accusations, the District Court 
explained: 
It is clear that Judge Dever was not persuaded that one party 
bore the bulk of the blame for the disputes regarding discovery. 
Instead, Judge Dever's decisions were an effort to facilitate 
discovery between seemingly equally contentious parties, all of 
which did not appear to be living up to their discovery 
obligations. 
(R. at 3913 (emphasis added).)The District Court further stated that "Judge Dever believed 
that Plaintiffs were not being totally forthcoming with information but that Defendants were 
overreaching in their discovery requests and were being contentious in not accepting 
Plaintiffs' responses to discovery requests." (Id.) 
To suggest that a finding of intentional misconduct on the part of PC Crane can 
be inferred from the Ruling is to ignore the detailed explanation provided by the District 
Court as to the relative blame of the parties. Because the District Court did not make the 
requisite factual finding of intentional misconduct necessary to support an award of 
sanctions, the award should be reversed. 
1
 It is noteworthy that McQueen first began formally accusing PC Crane of lying about 
documents in his first Motion to Compel filed in July 2007, just a few months after 
4 
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POINT II 
McOUEENS' ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT RELATING 
TO THE TRAILER DISCOVERY ARE INACCURATE AND 
DO NOT SUPPORT AN AWARD OF SANCTIONS. 
A, The Trailer Discovery Must be Viewed in Context. 
McQueen continues to seriously distort the evidence relating to the two trailers 
and the related discovery in order to support his accusations of misconduct. While PC Crane 
is confident that it has adequately responded to most of the accusations relating to the trailer 
discovery made by McQueen in its opening Brief, (Br. of Appellee at 12-17,33-36,) it feels 
compelled to briefly respond to some of the more serious accusations levied by McQueen in 
its Reply Brief. 
In this litigation, PC Crane alleged that McQueen misrepresented Lon Stam's 
role in securing work for the cranes at issue. PC Crane representatives testified they learned 
of Stam's relationship with the McQueen customers shortly after they signed the second 
Purchase Agreement in March 2005. {See R. at 2423.) 
McQueen sought to prove that PC Crane knew of Stam's role in securing work 
prior to March 2005. The focus of McQueen's initial discovery in this case was the timing of 
collaborations between PC Crane and Lon Stam. McQueen sought documents relating to a 
"custom designed trailer" mentioned in a loan packet sent to one of PC Crane's lenders a year 
after the purchase in April, 2006. In the document, PC Crane stated that it "collaborated" 
with Stam "in the building of a custom designed trailer" to be used with a crane known as the 
discovery began. (R. at 832-840.) 
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"300." (R. at 2464-2469 (emphasis added).) The discovery relating to the custom designed 
trailer was only relevant to show that PC Crane collaborated with Stam prior to March 2005. 
To put the statements made by PC Crane and its counsel in context, it is 
necessary to understand the changing focus of discovery during this case. In the beginning, 
discovery was focused, as it should have been, on the collaborations between PC Crane and 
Stam. McQueen's questions at the first set of depositions and its arguments at the hearing on 
September 5,2007 likewise focused on the timing of collaborations between the parties. (R. 
at 852-859, 861-862,4001, T. 29-31,) PC Crane's discovery responses to these first requests 
made clear that: (a) the collaborations on the custom designed trailer occurred in late 2005 or 
early 2006, long after PC Crane learned on its own of Stam's true role in the McQueen 
business; and (b) there were no documents reflecting the collaborations, which consisted of 
simple discussions between Stam and Paul Belcher. 
As McQueen began trying to prove that PC Crane was lying, the focus shifted 
to the construction of all trailers owned by PC Crane. (R. at 2081-2085) Based on 
"independent information" not disclosed to PC Crane at the time, McQueen believed that the 
custom designed trailer mentioned in the loan documents was in fact the Fontaine trailer 
2
 McQueen incorrectly paraphrases the loan document in footnote 9 of his Reply 
Memorandum. The document does not state that the trailer resulted in a dramatic revenue 
increase. Rather, it states that by down renting the 300 as a 165 ton crane, PC Crane was 
able to increase the utilization rate of the crane and thus the revenue. The trailers are not 
used in operating the cranes. They are used only to haul counterweights. The custom 
designed trailer would have reduced the number of trailers needed to haul weights for the 300 
ton crane in a 165 ton configuration from two to one. Thus saving money on the 
transportation costs associated with hauling the counter weights. (R. at 2271, 2501-2503.) 
6 
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modified by Vern Belcher in early 2005. Something that the evidence in the record shows is 
impossible.3 (Br. of Appellee at 12-17.) McQueen's second round of discovery therefore 
shifted the focus to the modification of any trailer owned by PC Crane. McQueen's 
arguments at the hearing on March 4,2008 likewise focused on the modification of trailers, 
i.e. that the "custom designed trailer" referenced in the loan application and the Fontaine 
were one and the same. (R. at 4002, T. 10-11.) 
At the March 4, 2008 hearing, the District Court instructed PC Crane to 
produce documents relating to any modifications of any trailer between October 2004 and 
December 2005.4 When counsel went back to PC Crane for more information on the actual 
modification of its trailers, it learned that the custom designed trailer for the 300 was never 
ultimately built. PC Crane promptly disclosed this fact to McQueen and once again certified 
that it had no documents relating to the custom designed trailer. (R. at 2717.) 
Believing that PC Crane and its counsel were lying, McQueen filed his Second 
Motion for Sanctions arguing: "There is no doubt that the [custom designed trailer] was in 
fact [the Fontaine]..." and asking for sanctions against PC Crane. (R.at 2259,2265.) At the 
March 31, 2009 hearing on McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions, PC Crane's counsel 
Paul P. Burghardt explained that because discovery requests had focused on collaborations 
and not construction, a miscommunication occurred. (R. 4003, T. 101.) 
3
 PC Crane's opening Brief contains a detailed explanation of this issue. (Br. of Appellee 
at 12-17.) 
4
 PC Crane had argued that the requests were beyond the scope of the District Court's prior 
discovery order relating to trailer discovery. 
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McQueen's initial discovery requests prompted discussions relating to the 
timing of collaborations between PC Crane and Stam. When the focus shifted to 
modifications, it resulted in a different inquiry and different information relating to the actual 
construction of trailers. 
After reviewing the extensive pleadings submitted by the parties in connection 
with McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions, the District Court held that PC Crane's 
statement that the trailer was never built was merely "inconsistent" with its prior 
representations. (R. at 3913.) This finding is not sufficient to support an award of sanction 
under Utah law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has said that a finding of fault is a necessary 
prerequisite to imposing sanctions for good reason. Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82, at ^[23. The 
understanding of information develops and changes as a case progresses. The state of facts 
at one point in time might easily be seen as inconsistent with the facts when viewed at a later 
date. If a merely "inconsistent" position was all that was required for sanctions, it would be 
difficult to imagine a single case like this one where sanctions would not be appropriate. It is 
for this reason that a court must make a specific finding that the party's conduct was 
"willful," in "bad faith," or involve some other kind of "intentional behavior" before 
imposing sanctions. Id. at ^[33. Because the District Court made no such finding here, the 
sanctions award should be reversed. 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. McQueen's Allegations Asserted Against PC Crane and its Counsel Are 
Not Supported by the Record. 
There is no factual support for McQueen's repeated allegations that PC Crane 
and its counsel "lied" about: (1) that the second trailer was actually "constructed," and (2) 
that the Fontaine trailer was not the custom designed trailer referenced in the loan 
application.5 (Reply Br. of Appellant at 13 -15.) 
/ . False Statements Regarding the Construction of the Custom Designed 
Trailer. 
Although counsel's actions are not at issue in this appeal, McQueen argues that 
PC Crane's counsel repeatedly told him and the District Court that the custom designed 
trailer was in fact "constructed." (Reply Br. of Appellant, at 5, 6, 7, 8 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.) 
McQueen attributes this statement or similar phrases to PC Crane's counsel more than 16 
times in its Reply Brief alone. (Id.) Yet, McQueen's Reply Brief does not include a single 
quotation from any such alleged statement. McQueen also fails to cite to a single place in the 
record containing any such representation.6 
5
 McQueen attempts to raise a new argument under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. McQueen argues that counsel's statements that the custom designed "trailer was 
constructed after April, 2005" violate Rule 11. (Reply Br. of Appellant at 15.) Even 
assuming that counsel had actually made such a representation, something that the record 
does not support, McQueen has not preserved this argument and the District Court did not 
impose any sanctions under Rule 11. 
6While McQueen does include some limited citations to statements in the record, none of 
the statements mention anything about the trailer being "constructed." They merely refer 
to the collaborations on the custom designed trailer between Stam and Paul Belcher 
which was the focus of the discovery at that time. (Reply Br. of Appellant at 15.). 
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In contrast, the discovery responses, hearing transcripts and written 
communications in the record clearly show that PC Crane did not make any representations 
to McQueen or the District Court stating that the custom designed trailer was actually 
constructed. The focus of the communications and the related discovery were on the timing 
of the collaborations between Stam and Paul Belcher, not the actual modifications. The 
following are actual quotes of some of the statements made by PC Crane's counsel relating to 
the custom designed trailer prior to March 2008: 
• In a letter dated August 13, 2007, counsel for PC Crane stated that: "During 
the relevant time period [October 2004 through March 2005], PC Crane and 
Mr. Stam had no communications or interactions concerning the subject 
trailer." (R. at 2281.) 
• At the September 5, 2007 hearing on McQueen's Motion to Compel, counsel 
for PC Crane stated: "there was a document produced by us that made some 
reference to Mr. Stam and PC Crane collaborating on a trailer. This trailer, 
Your Honor, as we certified in a letter, this collaboration occurred much after 
the purchase of the fourth crane in April of 2005. . . . The trailer wasn't even 
conceived of until the year 2006 between Stam and the Belchers. At that time, 
a year and a half after they purchased the first cranes, there clearly is no 
relevance to their collaboration on this trailer." (R. at 4001; T. 50-52 
(emphasis added).) 
• At the March 4, 2008 hearing Counsel explained as follows: 
10 
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THE COURT: What about this Exhibit No. 3 and the one he just 
gave us today, which is PC-273, where it talks about this drop-
deck trailer payment on March 29th? 
MR. BARNECK: Yes. 
THE COURT: Isn't that something that shows that you were 
working on some sort of a trailer? 
MR. BARNECK: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is that the trailer [at] issue? 
MR. BARNECK: No. And if counsel had asked in 
depositions, they would have been told that Vern Belcher did this 
one on his own. PC Crane wanted a drop-deck trailer like this, 
they wanted to create one. This was for a different crane. It was 
for the 165 Liebherr. The one that Counsel's complaining about 
from the loan documents was for the 300. Different crane. (R. at 
4002, T. 39.) 
None of these statements represent that the trailer was constructed. The 
references to the custom designed trailer were made to denote the subject of the relevant 
collaborations, not the actual construction or modification of the trailer as McQueen 
suggests. 
2. McQueen Refuses to Believe that the Fontaine was Not the Custom 
Designed Trailer, 
With respect to the Fontaine, McQueen refuses to accept the uncontroverted 
evidence that the Fontaine and the custom designed trailer could not in fact have been the 
same. In its opening brief, PC Crane recites in great detail the uncontroverted evidence 
supporting its position that the Fontaine was not the same as the custom designed trailer 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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referenced in the loan document. (Br. of Appellee at 12-17, 33-36.) PC Crane's 
representatives testified that it would be impossible to use the Fontaine in the way described 
in the loan document. (R. at 2473-2479, 2485-2489,2505-2506.) Even Judge Dever at the 
March 4,2008 hearing recognized that the two trailers were not the same and questioned the 
need for further discovery on that issue. At the hearing, he asked McQueen's counsel: 
I guess the question is is [sic] that, if they produce to you the invoices 
or whatever it is for these repairs of [the Fontaine], which is not the 
trailer that's at issue,... and you want to have discovery about what? 
The [Fontaine] trailer that the invoices say was repaired, when we 
know that, according to what you have and the information you have, is 
not the trailer that's at issue here? 
(R. at 4002, T. 73 (emphasis added). 
McQueen does not refute any of this evidence. Instead, McQueen attempts 
sidestep the uncontroverted facts in the record by arguing that the distinction between the two 
trailers is "irrelevant" to the issue of sanctions awarded by the District Court. (Reply Br. of 
Appellant at 12.) While PC Crane agrees that the issue is not relevant because the District 
Court did not award sanctions based on that dispute, McQueen spends a large portion of his 
Reply Brief accusing PC Crane and its counsel of lying about the two trailers. (Id. at 13-14.) 
McQueen accuses counsel of submitting "misleading discovery responses," "misleading the 
District Court," "evasive maneuvering," "dishonestly," "perversion of the legal process," 
"obfuscation," "lying," and "outright false statements." (Reply Br. of Appellant at 13-14.) 
PC Crane therefore feels obligated to briefly defend itself against accusations that McQueen 
accurately characterizes as "strong language." (Reply Br. of Appellant at 17 (emphasis 
added).) 
12 
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McQueen does not present any actual evidence to support its argument that the 
trailers were one in the same. McQueen's only support comes from its subjective 
interpretation of the documents, arguments of logical inferences that may be drawn, and its 
own supposition. McQueen repeatedly uses inferential phrases such as "necessarily false," 
"would thereby be shown," "cannot credibly claim," "is not credible," "would prove false," 
and the "only credible, logical explanation" to support his allegations. These phrases show 
that McQueen's supposed evidence is actually just argument based on inferences he feels 
must be drawn from the testimony and documents. Importantly, not a single witness ever 
testified that the Fontaine and the custom designed trailer were or could possibly have been 
the same one. 
In the end, McQueen simply refuses to acknowledge the abundance of evidence 
showing conclusively that the Fontaine was not the custom designed trailer and that Stam had 
no involvement in its construction. Because the District Court did not make any findings of 
fault against PC Crane based on these allegations, they will not support an award of sanctions 
and are irrelevant to the issues on appeal. 
POINT III 
THE AMOUNT OF COSTS AWARDED WAS IMPROPER. 
To recover costs, a party must show that "the deposition was used in some 
meaningful way at trial o r . . . the development of the case was of such a complex nature that 
the information provided by the deposition could not have been obtained through less 
expensive means of discovery." Young, 2000 UT 91, at \7. 
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Kelly Banyard Deposition. McQueen does not dispute that he did not use 
the Banyard deposition at trial. 
Jason K. Nelsen Deposition. McQueen also does not dispute that he did not 
use Nelsen's deposition at trial and that the District Court excluded Jason Nelsen's testimony 
as irrelevant in its Order in Limine. (R. at 3264-3268.) 
Courtney Belcher Deposition. McQueen does not dispute that Courtney 
Belcher's deposition was not used at trial. Although Courtney did say that she had not 
personally searched the computers, PC Crane pointed out that Mrs. Belcher was not the 
primary litigation contact, and that the computers had been searched on multiple occasions by 
other PC Crane personnel. McQueen also neglects to mention that the search of the 
computers did not, as predicted, turn up any additional documents. 
Second Depositions of Paul Belcher, David Belcher, Vernon Belcher, and Lon 
Stam. McQueen does not dispute that the depositions were not used at trial and that the 
District Court excluded the majority of the evidence on that subject by its Order on Motion in 
Limine Re: Trailer Modifications. (R. at 3269-3272.) Rather than support McQueen's case, 
the depositions showed that the Fontaine trailer could not have been the custom designed 
trailer identified a year later in the loan application. (R. at 2476, 2488.) 
For those reasons, this Court should reduce the District Court's award of costs 
by the amount of $1,771.65, which is the total of the deposition expenses referenced above. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, PC Crane respectfully requests this District 
Court to rule as follows. The Court should reverse the award of discovery sanctions for lack 
of a finding to support them. The Court should also reduce the amount of costs awarded as 
explained above. The Court should award no attorney fees or costs to McQueen on this 
Appeal. 
DATED this D_ day of September, 2010. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
MATTHEW C. BARNECK 
PAUL P. BURGHARDT 
Attorneys for Appellees and Cross-Appellants 
PC Crane, LLC, et al. 
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